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Summary of Part III-A: Impact of Military Threats on US Military Strategy

1. The key military threats to US national security continue to be posed by the USSR and its allies and clients. Despite increasingly vexing pressures and constraints on its economy and the growing political and military vulnerabilities in its empire, the Soviet Union is continuing to expand and modernize its strategic and conventional forces. Current Soviet leaders, moreover, are probably prepared to accept the necessary sacrifices to sustain the expansion of Soviet military power, which they see as the most important element in the growth of Soviet political influence.

2. We do not believe, however, that the USSR is seeking to use its military power directly against the United States or its allies, but rather sees this power as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure upon US allies and other states along the Soviet periphery: Western Europe, Pakistan, Iran, China, and Japan. The Soviets are concerned about current US plans and programs for rapid military modernization, but probably anticipate that US defense spending will be tempered by domestic resistance and economic dilemmas.

3. Direct military conflict with the USSR is much less probable than war with other states which are supported by the Soviet Union. In such a conflict, the risk of escalation to a confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the situation, but as a result of their expanded strategic military power the Soviets are probably less averse than in the past to take the risks which might lead to such a confrontation.

4. The Soviet military buildup, combined with the absence of effective resistance, has also encouraged the Soviets to adventures in the Third World. Utilizing proxies and mobilizing a diversified arsenal of arms, military and paramilitary training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and economic aid, the USSR in opportunistic fashion, continues to exploit and manipulate indigenous unrest in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, in order to undermine US influence, to bring Soviet sympathizers to power, and to acquire additional military bases.

5. Additional military threats to US interests are posed by the military forces of Soviet allies and friends in the Warsaw Pact and by those of Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Some of these states act as surrogates for the USSR in the Third World, and in the cases of Cuba, Libya, the PLO, and Syria, as conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that undertake terrorism.

6. Other military threats to US interests arise out of numerous regional hostilities which threaten to touch off military conflict on a much wider scale and draw in the superpowers: the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, China-USSR, China-Vietnam, India-Pakistan, and Greece-Turkey. Finally, the possession or potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by certain countries may pose additional military threats to the United States in the near future.

7. From a regional perspective, Europe and East Asia are the principal Soviet military concerns. In both regions, the USSR continues to expand and

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to modernize its theater nuclear and conventional forces. In Europe, the Soviets are deeply concerned about unrest in Poland. They are deeply engaged in exploiting and encouraging US-West European differences and the West European "peace movement." In East and Southeast Asia, the major military threats to US security interests stem from Soviet efforts to contain China, together with the related Soviet effort to hedge against the possibility of a Washington-Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of Soviet military might.

8. In the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the war between Iran and Iraq have combined to make the Persian Gulf area the focus of significant US strategic concern. In addition, acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that would harm US interests in the region.

9. The military threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the Communist exploitation of social and political unrest in Central America, and such exploitation constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests in the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR.

10. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively small, and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or domestic instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side of local clients.

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Part III-A

Impact of Military Threats on US National Security Strategy

1. The growing strategic and conventional military might of the USSR, its acquisition of military strongpoints far from its frontiers, and its willingness to provide training, military advisers, and arms to radical governments and insurgency movements in the Third World pose increasingly serious challenges to the United States. This effort has been sustained despite changes in the international environment, the limited US-Soviet accommodation of the 1970s, and the SALT agreements, but it has drawn scarce human and technical resources and raw materials from the Soviet economy. For the most part, the projection of Soviet power reflects opportunism--which has been heightened by the absence of effective US or allied resistance. It will become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to meet their military requirements, as demographic and energy problems combine with other fundamental difficulties to retard Soviet economic growth. Under these conditions, maintaining historical rates of growth in defense spending will be economically and politically more difficult. Even to, Soviets expenditures for strategic and defensive forces probably will increase during the next decade. Nevertheless, the inevitable succession problem which will occur shortly in the USSR make predictions of Soviet military policy in the future risky.

2. Direct military conflict with the Soviet Union, however, is much less probable than war with other states which are supported by the USSR. Since World War II, the United States has been engaged in major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam; and current regional tensions, especially in the Middle East,

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East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, could once again involve the United States in a war with a Soviet ally or client. In such a conflict, the risk of escalation to a confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the situation.

3. Additional military threats to US interests are posed by the military forces of Soviet allies and friends in the Warsaw Pact and by those of Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Still other military threats to US interests arise from numerous regional hostilities, the Arab-Israeli conflict, China-USSR, China-Vietnam, India-Pakistan, among others. Nuclear proliferation will become an increasingly serious problem in coming years as more and more countries continue to seek access to nuclear energy and, in some cases, to nuclear weapons. Many countries already have the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons, and more countries will acquire such a capability.

4. During an era of general political stability at home and relaxed tensions abroad Soviet military programs grew and entailed the proliferation of weapons development programs, the mass production of weapons systems, and the subordination of other interests to the military requirements of the state. This effort, combined with the limited group of US military capabilities in the 1970s, has reversed the quantitative US lead in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and so reduced the credibility of US nuclear forces as an umbrella for others. It has also increased the Soviet advantages in conventional military forces, and has enabled the USSR--aided by allies like Cuba--to project its political and military influence into the farthest reaches of the globe.

5. Utilizing proxies and mobilizing a diversified arsenal of arms sales, military and paramilitary training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and economic aid, the USSR continues to take advantage of indigenous unrest in the

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Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Such activities will continue as long as the Soviets perceive that they can undermine pro-Western governments without risking a major confrontation with the United States.

6. The improved Soviet strategic position relative to the United States may create a greater sense of security on the part of Soviet leaders bent on pursuing additional adventures outside their frontiers. This enhanced strategic position together with massive conventional military power, the availability of proxies, and willingness to provide or sell weaponry on a large scale permits the USSR to extend its influence in unprecedented fashion. Indeed, the USSR now projects its military and political presence into such remote regions as the Red Sea, Vietnam, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the bulk of its conventional forces--its divisions and associated tactical air forces--are largely confined to the Eurasian land mass, and its projectable forces could be matched by the United States and its allies.

7. During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought after goal of superpower status alongside the United States, codified in the SALT-related agreements and politically acknowledged in a series of bilateral accords, highlighted by the Joint Declaration of Principles Governing Relations Between the US and USSR. However, Moscow did not regard acknowledged "parity" as implying a global code of conduct acceptable to Washington. Moscow's pursuit of detente with the United States was accompanied by a perception of the United States as hamstrung by political indecision stemming not only from the trauma of Vietnam but the inability to achieve a domestic consensus on foreign policy in general and East-West issues in particular. In turn, the Soviets have probed US resolve by means of an increasingly assertive policy in the Third World, as witnessed by their military support ventures in Angola and

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Ethiopia, as well as their invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have also exploited detente to promote divisions between the United States and its NATO allies.

8. Strategic nuclear forces support Soviet foreign policy aims by projecting an image of military strength sufficient to offset the strategic forces of potential opponents. Soviet leaders appreciate the political importance of world perceptions of military power and have long acknowledged the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower status. They view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion of Soviet power and influence abroad. However, the Soviets do not believe that they currently enjoy significant strategic military advantages over the United States, and they fear the possible consequences of US military modernization efforts, especially the deployment of immediate range missles in Western Europe. But their apprehensions are tempered by a willingness to wait for current US determination to rebuild its military power to wane as a result of domestic opposition. Although they do not wish a major confrontation with the United States, the Soviets are probably less fearful of this occurring than they were five years ago. Thus, although the Soviets are unlikely to initiate military hostilities in an area of central importance to the United States like the Persian Gulf, they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by instability in Iran or Pakistan thereby initiating a sequence that could escalate into a major US-Soviet confrontation.

9. The Soviets have achieved capabilities for intercontinental nuclear conflict that are widely recognized as at least equal to those of the United States. The USSR will further improve the striking power and survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear offensive

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forces, make progress in overcoming some of the weaknesses of its strategic defenses, and improve its supporting command, control, and communications systems. Thus, the Soviets are expanding the capabilities of their SLBM force, and are developing mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental bomber. The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. They are well aware that the course of a nuclear conflict will probably not go according to plans. But Soviet leaders have apparently worked through many of the problems of conducting military operations in nuclear war, improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR. Indeed, the Soviets probably see their launch on tactical warning options as permitting a larger and more coordinated counterattack than retaliation.

10. The Soviets have also engaged in a vigorous modernization and expansion of their theater and peripheral nuclear forces. This effort has been highlighted by continuing deployments of the SS-20, the Backfire bomber --which is also capable of performing intercontinental missions--and new generations of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. They are now in a better position to match any NATO escalation of a European conflict from one level of nuclear war to another and have acquired increased capabilities to use peripheral strike forces opposite China and throughout the Eurasian periphery.

11. In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly expanded their forces opposite Europe and China, while introducing a combat force of about 100,000 men into Afghanistan. They have also developed the ability to project their power into the Third World, as demonstrated most strikingly by the Soviet airlifts of Cuban proxy forces and military materiel into Angola in

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1975 and Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviets have not developed forces specifically for overseas invasion. They rely instead on general purpose forces designed principally for use in Europe and along the Soviet periphery, but they also have airborne forces suitable for operations in more distant areas. For the most part, the Soviets will continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World and will be unlikely to commit their own forces to such operations. However, in light of their enhanced strategic force capabilities and continued expansion of general purpose forces, the Soviets may be more willing to accept the risks of confrontation with the United States in a serious crisis, particularly in an area like the Persian Gulf where they enjoy military or geopolitical advantages.

12. Since 1965, the growth of Soviet defense spending averaged about 4 percent a year--about the same as that for the overall economy. Throughout this period Soviet priorities among the services have remained relatively constant. The defense share of GNP has risen 12 to 13 percent, to 14 percent in 1979. Between 1971 and 1980, the estimated cumulative cost of Soviet defense activities (excluding pensions)--that is, the cost of reproducing them in the United States--exceeded cumulative US defense outlays by 40 percent. For 1980, the estimated Soviet dollar costs were $195 billion --50 percent higher than total US outlays. If defense spending continues to grow at about 4 percent per year and economic growth continues to decline, the defense share of GNP could increase to 15 percent in 1985 and might approach 20 percent by the end of the decade. This would erode future increments to GNP that have been so important in the past for easing internal political-economic tensions. Indeed, although the preparation of the 1981-85 economic plan has involved particularly vexatious decisions about the allocation of resources between the defense and nondefense sectors of the economy, we have seen no

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indications of a shift of resources away from the defense sector.

13. The problems in the economy as a whole have made the acquisition of Western goods and technology increasingly important to Soviet defense programs:

-- Western goods have helped to improve the performance of a strained economy, and this has lightened the burden of growth in defense spending.

-- More directly, legal and illegal acquisitions of military-related technology have saved the Soviets considerable time and resources in designing and producing new weapons and military support systems.

The importance in the 1980s of raising the technological sophistication of weapons will ensure continued Soviet interest in obtaining advanced Western technologies.

14. The West could slow improvement in the performance of Soviet weapons by the late 1980s or the early 1990s by broadening controls over exports of military-related technology--and increasing its efforts to plug leakages. While there is little likelihood that even comprehensive and sustained Western economic sanctions in the near term would significantly affect Soviet military programs--many of which are already well under way--such sanctions applied for a number of years could make qualitative improvements to Soviet weapon systems more expensive.

15. Complicating the Soviet economic dilemma are serious problems within the Soviet empire, instability along its periphery, indigenous unrest within its overseas strongpoints, and continued hostility with China combined with the prospect of US-Chinese military cooperation. Events in Poland and Afghanistan reveal how shallow the roots of Communism are in those countries

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and create the spectre of "ideological contamination" elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc. Unrest in Poland in particular brings into question once more the reliability of Warsaw Pact forces in the event of war in Europe and the security of Soviet lines of communication and logistics.

16. Turmoil along the Soviet periphery, notably in Iran, also reinforces the long-time Soviet obsession with the need for order and friendly regimes along its frontiers. Turmoil may also present opportunities to the Soviets, again notably in Iran. Moreover, internal unrest and in some cases insurgency have come to plague a number of Soviet overseas clients. Thus, even while the Soviet presence in Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, Vietnam, and even Syria is vulnerable, these countries continue to consume scarce Soviet resources, placing additional burdens on the Soviet economy. The Polish crisis has greatly increased the magnitude of these burdens. The drain on Soviet resources, therefore, can pose acute dilemmas for Soviet leaders, dilemmas which will intensify to the extent the Soviet empire continues to grow.

17. Despite the growing burdens of empire, however, Soviet leaders are likely to maintain the pace of their military expenditures in the next few years in order to cope with instability within the East Bloc and along the Soviet frontier and to buttress insecure friends and allies in the Third World. Moreover, the very insecurity which its imperial problems have created for Moscow may encourage the Soviets to act to try to overcome them, particularly before current US defense plans are carried forth. The invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland illustrate that the USSR will react vigorously where it sees its vital interests at risk.

18. Concurrent with their military effort, the Soviets will pursue an arms control dialogue with the United States and the West. The strategic arms control process in particular remains important to Moscow as a means of

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constraining the potential military competition from the United States. Indeed, a major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce the possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might seriously jeopardize Moscow's strategic nuclear status. The economic motivation behind Moscow's arms control policy is less evident. Soviet spending for all strategic forces--offensive and defensive--constitutes only about 20 percent of total military expenditures. The economic benefits derived from limitations on strategic arms would likely be small, at least in the near term.

19. Soviet interests in arms control are also reinforced by political considerations. Globally, the Soviets have advocated a myriad of propagandistic arms control measures (such as proposals for "zones of peace" and nuclear-free zones), designed in large part to curry favor with nonaligned Third World states and to bring diplomatic pressure on the United States to curtail its military presence in strategically important regions. In Europe in particular, arms control overtures are a complement to diplomatic efforts aimed at countering NATO charges of excessive Soviet military strength and of Soviet military "aggressiveness."

20. Complementing Soviet eagerness for arms control agreements and rhetoric on behalf of East-West detente, is Moscow's deep engagement in support of revolutionary violence worldwide and probes for geopolitical advantages. With Moscow's aid and encouragement, a number of radical regimes have come to power during the past decade--in Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia--which are fundamentally anti-American, and the Soviet Union continues to court these and other Third World states assiduously. The USSR also directly or indirectly supports a number of national insurgencies (e.g., SWAPO in Namibia) and ethnic-separatist movements (e.g., the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Middle East) by providing them with arms, advice, military

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training, and political backing. In addition, the USSR supports allied or friendly governments and entities--notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, East European states, South Yemen, Syria, and Cuba--which in turn directly or indirectly aid the subversive or terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of violent revolutionaries in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Western Europe. For their part, these Soviet proxies directly or indirectly are applying military or paramilitary pressure upon governments friendly to the United States, for example, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Sudan, and Somalia.

21. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales, military technicians and advisers, and military training (locally and within the USSR) are potent sources of Soviet political influence in the Third World. The total value of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales and assistance deliveries worldwide peaked in 1979 (approximately $12.4 billion) but continues at a high level (approximately $10.6 billion in 1980 and $4.5 billion in the first half of 1981). In addition to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, North Korea, Romania, and East Germany also provide large amounts of military assistance to Third World countries. Middle Eastern governments--notably Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq--are the major recipients of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales and assistance, but Sub-Saharan African and Asia are also major targets of such military sales and assistance. The amount of influence it buys is arguable, but there is no question the aims sold tempt receipients to aggressive actions.

22. The influx of large numbers of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military technicians and advisers in the Middle East (6,400 in 1981), Sub-Saharan Africa (10,500 in 1981), and Asia (3,700 in 1981) has provided the Soviets with some political leverage, a potential basis for a greater military presence in the future, and, in some cases, actual battlefield experience.

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And the military training of large numbers of Third World nationals in the Soviet bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of sympathizers and allies when they return home.

23. The military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its friends and allies is manifested in a number of regions, especially those of greatest priority to them: Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, in several regions, particularly Latin America, there are military threats posed by Soviet proxies, insurgency and terrorism, and local conflicts that do not at present involve either superpower directly. Indeed, regional hostilities within NATO, such as the long-simmering dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and territorial claims in the Aegean, could weaken Alliance security.

Europe

24. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces capable of winning a war in Europe whether conventional or nuclear. The Soviets take a cautious view of NATO's military capabilities and of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These concerns and their evident conviction that military power is a key element of a successful foreign policy have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO in general purpose and strategic forces. While the Soviets are very unlikely to initiate military hostilities against NATO, they may well use their military advantages in Europe to exert political pressure on NATO members and to encourage US-West European differences as well as "pacifist" and "neutralist" trends in Western Europe.

25. The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large, combat ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets would prefer to achieve

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their theater objectives without using nuclear weapons. They apparently believe that a theater nuclear war would arise either when NATO used, or was preempted from using, nuclear weapons to avoid losing the conventional war, or, less likely, when the Warsaw Pact had to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO break-through. In this phase the Soviets would use, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, hundreds of peripheral and some intercontinental range missiles and aircraft against NATO's forward based nuclear forces and against China, if the conflict had spread to the Far East. Their naval and air forces, using both nuclear and conventional weapons, would continue strikes against enemy naval strike forces.

26. The military balance in Europe, however, poses delicate problems for overall Soviet policy. The Soviets probably perceive that their buildup has been an important element in continued Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. They probably also see their forces as a deterrent against political or military developments that would alter the European balance of power. Furthermore, the confluence of Moscow's military buildup with increasing US-Soviet tensions has heightened West European concerns about limited nuclear war in Europe, and has provoked political schisms in West Europe over NATO's defense policy. This in turn has jeopardized NATO's fragile NATO consensus in favor of deployments of new theater nuclear missiles. Nevertheless, the Soviets know that if they appear too threatening, they risk a galvanizing of NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued, with some success, a dual policy: improving its military strength while pursuring arms control talks, attempting to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a massive propaganda campaign--supplemented by covert activities--designed to undermine public support for NATO's defense effort, particularly INF. In the meantime,

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the Soviets have continued with deployments of new SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers, thus reinforcing their overall superiority in INF systems opposite NATO.

27. The Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear contingent has experienced the greatest growth over the past 15 years: more than a doubling in the number of aircraft, rockets, missiles, and artillery available for nuclear weapons delivery. There also has been substantial growth in ground force manpower and weapons inventories as the size of divisions and support elements has increased. Since 1970, overall Pact ground force manpower has increased by more than 400,000. Air and naval forces have also grown; but, more importantly, they have been substantially modernized so as to increase their effectiveness in both nuclear and nonnuclear environments.

28. During the 1980s, improvements are likely to focus more on quality than quantity. The Soviets will face a series of very difficult problems relating both to maintaining state-of-art technology in advanced weapons systems and coping with future manpower stringencies. Potentially the most threatening problems for the USSR, however, are political. The question of the reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in a war with the West has always been present; recent events in Poland have made it even more pressing.

29. The military threat to Europe and the NATO Alliance will be affected by developments within Western Europe. Strains within the NATO alliance and the potential estrangement of some West European neutrals from some US policies are likely to make US relations with these countries more contentious. The European allies will seek increasingly to coordinate their policies on international trade, security, and Third World issues in order to present the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This

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tendency toward bifurcation within the Alliance may increasingly hinder NATO as a mechanism for determining and coordinating security policy. Neutrals such as Austria and Sweden probably will not be ideologically disposed toward US policies and actions in the Third World and will attempt to apply their exaggerated weight in international fora to oppose US initiatives.

30. The Soviets are increasingly persuaded that NATO cohesion is declining, and they have undertaken a massive overt and covert campaign to assist the West European "peace movement" and to foster US-West European disagreements on security issues. Moscow may believe that growing West European-US discord, combined with Soviet military advantages in Europe, will make America's NATO allies increasing vulnerable to Soviet pressures and promote neutralist tendencies in some of them.

East and Southeast Asia

31. The major military threats to US security interests in this region stem from the Soviet Union's expanding military power and access, North Korea's military buildup and aggressive posture, and Vietnam's capabilities and options. Soviet military power in the region serves as an instrument of a foreign policy program that seeks to contain or reduce China's influence, decrease American and Japanese influence in the region, discourage anti-Soviet policies on the part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system. A Sino-Soviet conflict would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese relationship, forcing the United States to decide whether it wished to be involved and, if so, to what extent. Such a conflict could arise as a result of renewed tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier or an escalation of a new Sino-Vietnamese clash. Similarly, the possibility of Soviet efforts to intimidate Japan militarily

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might also test the credibility of the US security guarantee to its allies in Northeast Asia. Finally, the Soviets will exploit every opportunity to disrupt evolving Sino-US relations.

32. The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could directly involve US forces exists on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea remains dedicated to reunifying the Peninsula on its own terms and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve its goal. The decade-long North Korean military buildup is aimed at insuring the credibility of the military reunification option. Despite its military advantages over its southern counterpart, considerations that discourage North Korea from attempting forceful reunification include: the US security commitment and US military presence, the strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to maintain the status quo.

33. The ability of Moscow or Beijing to restrain North Korean military adventurism has been reduced as Pyongyang has become increasingly self-sufficient in providing for its armed forces. Pyongyang's continuing investment in the military sector indicates that the North plans to maintain its option for war as a means of achieving its overriding goal of reunification. Thus, any changes in the factors now discouraging North Korean aggression that Pyongyang would perceive as substatially altering the situation in its favor might induce the North Koreans to attack. However, North Korea would run out of ammunition within months without external assistance.

34. Aggressive action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely cause of expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. About 180,000 Vietnamese combat troops in Kampuchea directly threaten Thai security.

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Vietnamese forces might strike into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it could no longer tolerate Thai support of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Kampuchea because such support was preventing Vietnam's pacification of the country. Any Vietnamese ground or air strikes would have severe consequences, especially in view of US and Chinese security ties to Thailand and the USSR's considerable commitment to Hanoi. China with or without US encouragement, might threaten a second border war in order to remind the Vietnamese that they are vulnerable along their northern front.

35. A renewal of fighting between China and Vietnam would lead to increased Soviet support of an important ally in Southeast Asia. At least initially, this support probably would not include direct Soviet military operations against China or the introduction of Soviet combat forces in Vietnam. Rather, we would expect the Soviets to respond with a propaganda campaign against China and to increas substantially their material aid to Vietnam. If the conflict were prolonged or were going badly for Vietnam, however, limited Soviet military actions against China would be possible.

36. The Far East is second only to the European theater in importance for Soviet military policy. Its strategic value, combined with its remoteness from the heartland of greater Russia, makes regional security an especially difficult problem in Soviet eyes. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy. Furthermore, the long, slender supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously close to a hostile China--hence vulnerable to attack and interruption.

37. The buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East from 1965 through the early 1970s, was characterized by rapid growth of ground and air combat force levels. Since the early 1970s, it has been marked by more moderate and slower growth in active forces, and has emphasized the creation of a substantial

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reserve force structure, the enhancement of existing forces through weapons modernization, improvements in the combat support infrastructure, and the development of new command structures to control and employ the forces. The Soviet military now has a substantial portion of its general purpose forces committed in the Far East. The Soviets are also capable of an effective defense and strong offensive operations:

-- Roughly a threefold increase in the number of ground force divisions and a fivefold increase in fixed-wing aircraft have been accompanied by an expansion of support forces and substantial increases in the numbers of tanks, artillery, armed helicopters, and air defenses. About a quarter of the total Soviet ground and tactical air forces are now located in the Far East.

-- The Pacific Ocean Fleet (the largest of the four Soviet fleets) has grown significantly and has acquired more capable surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, replenishment ships, and aircraft.

-- There has been substantial growth and modernization of the theater and strategic nuclear delivery systems available for use against targets in the region. More than half of the SS-20 IRBM force, for example, can be targeted against China or other countries in Asia.

38. Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to contain China and diminish US influence, for the present complementing Vietnam's national interests in the region. For their sizable economic investment in support of Vietnamese policy in Indochina, the Soviets have already realized substantial returns that further their regional interests. They have a highly visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have gained access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities that enhance their military capabilities in Southeast

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Asia. These facilities enable the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean deployments and to expand intelligence collection capabilities in the region. Moscow will seek greater influence in Southeast Asia over the longer term by using Vietnam and the neighboring Indochina states to strengthen its presence in the region, even though Vietnam is a major drain on Soviet economic resources.

39. Although the Soviets have established permanent fortifications in defensive zones along the border with China, they are not resigned to conducting a static defense. They have developed a decisive conventional and nuclear military capability to give them the capacity for major offensive operations beyond their own borders. Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the Soviets in a global war or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on factors such as their political objectives, the degree of their superiority over Chinese forces, and the military situation in other theaters. In a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese should expect a Soviet offensive to seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the United States would be faced with operations designed to prevent the use of Japanese bases.

40. Other than fighting a major war, Soviet forces in the Far East could be used to apply pressure on China to abandon its evolving relationship with the United States. A significant deterioration in Sino-US relations might induce a limited Sino-Soviet accommodation which would have the most serious consequences for US security in Asia.

41. Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is now reasonably secure, the Soviets observe no basic change in China's hostile posture toward the USSR, and at the same time see intensified US pressure on

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Japan to assume a greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They have also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to maintain sizable forces in South Korea and to strengthen Seoul's political, economic and military structure.

42. To meet these perceived challenges during the coming decade, the Soviets will continue to depend on superior military power as the critical instrument of foreign policy. Thus, changes to their military capabilities will be aimed at:

-- Ensuring Soviet territorial security by deterring potential Chinese aggression or containing a Sino-Soviet conflict.
-- Developing further Soviet offensive military capabilities to improve their capability to inflict damage on China's military-industrial capability and seize all or portions of Manchuria.
-- Countering US naval and air forces in the region.
-- Preventing China from taking any advantage of Soviet involvement in a war with NATO.
-- Limiting American, Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
-- Frustrating and delaying the emergence of a "Washington-Beijing-Tokyo axis" with links to NATO.
-- Encouraging the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system.

In the last decade, the Soviets' military policy has led to a much stronger military posture in the Far East. However, their stationing of a division on the Japanese-claimed islands, their invasion of Afghanistan, and their support for Vietnam have all hampered other Soviet regional political objectives.

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43. Finally, several Southeast Asian countries are troubled by long-standing insurgencies. These insurgencies are largely contained by government forces at present, but they could be fueled if external powers were tempted to greater involvement.

44. The greatest potential for intensification of insurgency is in the Philippines. The New People's Army (NPA), operating in various parts of the country, has been successful in exploiting popular dissatisfaction with the Government and, although still relatively small, is considered the most formidable long-term threat to security. The NPA threat will continue to be a serious concern because of the grave consequence for US security interests (particularly our military bases at Subic and Clark) should it prosper.

45. Otherwise, we see little prospect for radical domestic upheavals that would be seriously detrimental to US interests during the near-term, even though local conditions may be conducive to varying degrees of political change. Again, the question of future political stability in the Philippines will be of particular concern.

The Near East, South and Southwest Asia

46. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the war between Iran and Iraq have combined to make the Persian Gulf area with its major oilfields the dominant US strategic concern in the Middle East. The most severe and persisting dangers are that Iran might fall prey to increased Soviet influence or pressure, and possibly military intervention; that friendly states may be attacked by other local states--most immediately that the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the fighting and again threaten other Gulf Arabs--; and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly exacerbated by

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the Soviets.

47. The potential for greater Soviet influence in Iran and in other countries surrounding the Arabian peninsula, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia is the dominant strategic concern in the area. It overshadows Iran's efforts to export its Islamic revolution to neighboring countries, efforts deflected by the Iran-Iraq war and which may be intensified. Pakistan, in particular, may be subjected to direct Soviet military pressures. The Soviets already have sought to intimidate Pakistan by diplomatic warnings, by condemning, if not provoking a number of attacks by Afghan helicopters on Pakistani border outposts, and by supporting anti-government terrorist elements.

48. The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the present the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against Israel. Even without this advantage, Israel will maintain its wide margin of military superiority over the Arab states and remain capable of defeating any combination of Arab forces. Although this superiority would serve to deter a premeditated Arab attack, skirmishes in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a wider conflict. Less likely, Syria might inititate hostilities on the Golan Heights in an effort to attain political objectives and negotiating leverage despite the prospect of its defeat on the battlefield. In a major Israeli conflict with the Arabs, the possibility of Soviet intervention must be considered.

49. Egypt is unlikely to participate in any Arab hostilities against Israel. Cairo could help safeguard US strategic interests in the Red Sea basin, which is growing in importance as a staging area for protection of the Arabian Peninsula and as a terminus for new oil pipelines. Egypt's ability to provide military assistance outside its own borders is questionable, however, given the steady decline in its combat capabilities.

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50. A more troublesome adversary is Libya, whose sizeable equipment inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for subversion and terrorism are viewed with alarm by the Egyptians and others in the Middle East. Qadhafi shows no sign of curbing his troublemaking and his efforts to undermine moderate regimes and Western influence in the area. Nevertheless, the Libyan military will remain ineffective in exploiting its plethora of weapons in conventional combat.

51. Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion, the war in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and Algeria will remain a lesser threat to US interests than the fluid conditions around the Persian Gulf and the threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Moreover, US ability to deal with the Soviet threat will be complicated by the increasing linkage of military developments around the Gulf with Arab-Israeli issues.

52. Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part by Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the development of a nuclear weapons production capability. India will become increasingly concerned and might undertake either a military strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities or the production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New Delhi's calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities of weapons-usable fissible material. Any Indian attack would rapidly escalate into a full-scale war.

53. Both the Soviets and the United States will face significant obstacles in their efforts to bolster and direct the military capabilities of regional states:

-- Neither the United States nor the USSR is likely to be able to exercise effective control over the use of weapons supplied to more adventuresome clients and allies such as Israel, Syria, and Libya.

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-- All states in the region, but to a lesser extent Israel, will have substantial difficulty in alleviating shortages of skilled manpower in military specialties. The Arab states, especially, will be slow in absorbing and exploiting the full potential of the even more sophisticated weapon systems that will enter the region and in building a logistic and support infrastructure capable of sustaining high-intensity combat.

54. Although terrorism will not be eradicated if the Palestinian issue is resolved in the Middle East peace process, there could be a substantial impact on Palestinian involvement in international terrorism. Moderate Arab states would likely reduce significantly their financial support, which could seriously affect the ability of radical Palestinian elements to influence terrorist activities. Nonetheless, funding and support for various terrorist groups constitute a practice which is likely to be continued by some radical states, especially Libya.

Latin America

55. The military threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the Communist exploitation of social and political trends in Central America, and such exploitation constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests in the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR. Owing to US military and geopolitical advantages, however, it is doubtful that the USSR would be prepared to engage in a major confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean or Central America. A continuation of the present trends could result in victory for the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for the revolutionaries in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab forces providing

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external support and management help to the insurgencies intend to make Central America a battleground over the next few years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of the world. The evolution of these scenarios would bring the revolution to Mexico's border and Panama, thereby raising the risks of internal destabilization and infiltration by radical leftists.

56. Prospects are probably dim for reversing Central America's slide toward increasing instability within the next 12 to 15 months. During this period, political extremism and economic deprivation will intensify, producing domestic conditions conducive to further revolutionary growth.

57. Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and opportunities to undermine US prestige, Fidel Castro since 1978 has increased virtually all types of assistance to revolutionaries in the region, including arms, funding, and training. The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded its involvement--efforts complemented by some East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and the PLO. Given the current situation, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.

58. Moreover, Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet upgrading of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have enabled the Soviet Union to make extensive use of Cuban facilities, and have resulted in Soviet/Cuban collaboration in intervention abroad. Because of Cuba's strategic position adjacent to key SLOCs in the Caribbean, its growing military capabilities and its ties with the Soviet Union pose a threat to US security interests in the Carabbean. The Cuban Armed Forces are already the most powerful in Latin America.

59. The principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and to use Nicaragua as

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a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the region. Indeed by virtue of its location, cooperation with Communist and other radical advisers, and support for Central American insurgencies, Nicaragua has become a hub for revolution in Central America.

60 External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build what is already the region's largest standing army; Nicaragua's armed forces will overshadow those of its Central American neighbors by 1983. Managua's leaders consider that they must protect the Sandinista revolution by building up Nicaragua's armed strength. At the same time, however, this buildup is intimidating governments in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution.

61. Regional rivalries as well as political and economic instability elsewhere in Latin America could prove tempting targets for direct or indirect Soviet involvement in the future. The Soviets already have an extensive and long-standing arms supply relationship with Peru, including the stationing of military advisers there. The Soviets, moreover, offered in 1976 to train Peruvian intelligence officers in the USSR, and some Peruvians have already received such training.

Sub-Saharan Africa

62. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively small and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or domestic instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side of local clients. These for the most part are the consequences of indigenous factors including racial animosities, ethnic and tribal communalism,

63. Since 1974 the Soviets have managed to achieve major gains and significantly strengthened their position in Africa, although they were not

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immune to reverses in Somalia, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Cape Verde. Despite these setbacks, however, since 1974 the Soviets have:

-- Used their airlift and sealift capabilities to provide large-scale military assistance, military advisers, and technicians to clients at great distances from the USSR.
-- Helped keep in power pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia including exercising command and control functions for Ethiopia in its war with Somalia.
-- Signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mozambique.
-- Gained the use of a naval facility on Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in the Red Sea.
-- Used their presence in Ethiopia to conduct reconnaissance flights over the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean.
-- Used Luanda in Angola as a naval facility and staging point for reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic.
-- Greatly increased military assistance and arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa.
-- Profited from the employment in combat operations of large numbers of Cuban proxy military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. (In 1980 there were 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and 11,000 to 13,000 in Ethiopia.)
-- Encouraged and coordinated the placement of hundreds of East Germans in security, organizational, and propaganda training jobs in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and other countries.
-- Channeled arms to insurgents operating in Namibia, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa.
-- Provided technical military assistance and even military advisers

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to Libyan forces in Chad.

64. Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could be:

-- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing military assistance--either directly or through the Cubans--to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.

-- Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if threatened with internal collapse.

-- Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country--with or without Soviet encouragement. For example, Ethiopian encroachment on Somalia.

-- Soviet aquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.

-- An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region.

-- Stepped up Cuban and Soviet involvement with Southern African states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and Havana to counter South Africa's military posture.

65. Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely to present a frontal challenge to the West in the areas of access to strategic metals or oil. They would not be able either to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for themselves, or--barring a collapse of political order in South Africa--to impose a prolonged denial of them to the West; nor does Soviet behavior to date suggest that they are currently pursuing either a seizure or

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a denial strategy in the near or middle term. Likewise, Soviet naval activities do not signal an active intention to interfere with the flow of oil supplies for the West, given the high risk this would entail and Soviet naval inferiority in the region. Rather, these activities are intended to promote essentially political objectives--as well as enhance the USSR's future strategic capabilities in the area.

66. Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure greatly heightened future Soviet influence. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their own failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek greater economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s the Soviets will be vulnerable to Western counteraction, particularly with respect to:

-- The Soviet inability to compete with the West in trade and economic development assistance.
-- The dissatisfaction of African military forces with the quality of Soviet arms, availabilty of spare parts, level of maintenance provided, and training.
-- The dependence of the Soviets on Cuban proxy military forces could force difficult choices on the Soviets if the Cubans decided to remove or reduce their troops in Angola or Ethiopia.
-- The incompleteness so far with which Soviet-style political controls have been institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the potential for leadership defection from Soviet tutelage.

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-- Suspicion among Africans of Soviet intentions, reinforced by Moscow's arm-twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for short-term tactical gains and by African awareness of attempted Soviet subversion.

-- The perception that "Russians" harbor racist attitudes.

-- Soviet lack of leverage to encourage the sort of negotiated resolutions of the Namibian and--perhaps eventually--South African problems that many black African countries would probably prefer to see.

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